This paper proposes a model of reference dependent preferences to explain overbidding in private and common value auctions. It is assumed that the reference point is proportional to the value of the object and that losses are weighed more heavily than gains in the utility function. Equilibrium bidding strategies are derived for firstand second-price private and common value auctions. We find that this model fits the data of all experiments analyzed, both private and common value, better in terms of the Bayesian Information Criterion than a standard risk neutral model; moreover, it explains overbidding in all private value and some common value auctions better than other alternative models. These results suggest that reference dependence, among other factors, might play a role in the widespread tendency of subjects to overbid in most experimental auctions.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a model of reference dependent preferences to explain overbidding in first-and second-price private and common value auctions. Bidders compute gains and losses relative to a reference point, which is assumed to be proportional to the value of the object. We derive symmetric equilibrium bid strategies in all four cases and test the model empirically against other alternatives using data from previous well-known experiments. Like Stigler (1950) we believe that theories should be evaluated according to (i) generality, (ii) tractability and (iii) congruence with reality. The model we present in this paper is general (standard preferences being a special case), tractable (it is straightforward to generalize known symmetric equilibrium bid functions to include reference dependence) and fits experimental data better than models with standard (risk neutral) preferences and other alternatives.
It is a well-established and robust empirical fact that experimental subjects overbid relative to the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE) strategy in several classes of auctions. Kagel and Roth (1995) provides a good survey of the literature and experimental results. Overbidding relative to the RNNE can be rationalized by considering preferences differing from standard risk neutrality such as risk aversion, joy of winning (Cox et al., 1988) and spite motives (Morgan et al., 2003) or through bounded rationality.
In independent private value (IPV) first-price auctions the generally accepted explanation for overbidding is risk aversion. However, other possibilities have been explored, like Goeree et al. (2002) who use non-linear probability weighting plus Quantal Response Equilibrium to describe choices in a discrete first-price private value auction. Overbidding has also been observed in IPV second-price auctions, Cooper and Fang (2008) carried out a series of experiments where bidders could buy noisy signals about the value of the opponents. Their results provide support for both bounded rationality and non-standard preferences as causes of overbidding.
Overbidding in common value actions is often attributed to the tendency of subjects to overestimate the value of the object. This intuition has been analyzed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) , who introduced the Cursed Equilibrium concept where bidders do not fully take into account the informational content of winning and as a consequence misestimate the true value of the object. More recently, Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) proposed a nonequilibrium model to explain overbidding using the Level-k model of Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995) , where bidders have different depths of reasoning and best respond given their inconsistent beliefs. Bounded rationality certainly plays a role in this tendency of subjects to overbid, however, some researchers (Ivanov et al., 2010) provide evidence that factors other than inconsistent beliefs might be at work in explaining overbidding in commonvalue auctions.
All of the previous explanations have the characteristic of being applicable to some type of auctions but not others. For example, risk aversion can explain overbidding in IPV first-price auctions but not in second-price since the weakly dominant strategy of bidding the value is independent of risk attitudes. Moreover, we share with other researchers our reservations as to the role played by risk aversion as the cause of overbidding. Kagel and Roth (1992) claim that "risk aversion cannot be the only factor and may well not be the most important factor behind bidding above the risk neutral Nash Equilibrium found so often in first-price private value auctions." Goeree et al. (2002) observe "In spite of the obvious appeal of risk aversion as an explanation, we too are not completely convinced that it is the best explanation."
The Level-k model cannot account for overbidding in IPV second-price auctions because the choice of L-k players coincide with the weakly dominant strategy while Cursed Equilibrium is a concept meant to be applied to common but not private value auctions. The model we propose falls in the first class of explanations (non-standard preferences) and it is more generally applicable in the sense that it can rationalize overbidding in the four types of auctions considered in this paper. Although by no means we believe that reference dependence is the only factor playing a role in the tendency of subjects to overbid, we do believe that it is indeed a factor.
Previous work analyzing auctions with reference dependent preferences includes Lange and Ratan (2010) , who analyze how independent private value auctions with induced values differ from auctions for commodity items. Since money and items are consumed in different dimensions of the consumption space they state that the conclusions derived in experimental settings cannot necessarily be transferred to the field. They show that in their model with induced values an increase in loss aversion will increase bids above the risk-neutral equilibrium in first-price auctions but they cannot explain overbidding in second-price auctions. Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) analyze a model with a reference point determined by a combination of reserve prices and exogenous factors. They derive equilibrium bids in firstand second-price independent private-value auctions in which there is overbidding relative to the RNNE. Shunda (2009) develops a model similar to Rosenkranz and Schmitz but in which the reference point is determine by a combination of the reserve and buy-it-now price. However, both those models are different from ours since they assume that the reference point is independent of the value of the object and there are no psychological costs associated with losing the auction. Moreover, our paper is the first, as far as we know, that compare statistically a reference dependent model to other alternatives.
Model
In a seminal article Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that (i) deviations of the value function are relative to the reference point, (ii) that this function is steeper for losses than for gains and (iii) that the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses. In this paper we will assume (i) and (ii), and consider a linear approximation around the reference point on the grounds that stakes in the experiments are small, thus dispensing with (iii) in exchange for greater tractability.
A common problem arising when modeling reference dependent preferences is to determine what constitutes the reference point (Koszegi and Rabin (2006) ). Here we propose as a starting point that the reference point is proportional to the value of the object, giving a bidder's value function
where v is the value of the object, b is the bid, R > 0 is the constant of proportionality for the reference point and c > 1 describes the property that the value function is steeper for losses than for gains. Notice that if R = 0 the value function defined above simplifies to the traditional risk-neutral case. The specification in (1) has the added benefit of allowing the derivation of equilibrium bidding functions depending on only one extra parameter, greatly simplifying the estimation procedure. Just for illustration purposes we can see this in the independent private value first-price auction by writing expected payoffs
where α = v(1 + R(c − 1)) > 1 for R > 0 and c > 1. It is straightforward to see that the bid function will depend on the private value v and the new parameter α since the second term is independent of the bid. This second term acts as a psychological fixed cost that bidders pay independently of the auction outcome. Needless to say, the majority of bidders will obtain negative ex-post utility (A psychological dissatisfaction with the outcome of the auction) given the specification in (1), however, this does not represent a violation of individual rationality.
1
In the following subsections we derive equilibrium bid functions in both the first-and second-price common value auctions 2 since private values are a particular case. Consider the setting analyzed in Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
3 There are N bidders and the value for bidder i is given by V i = v i (S, X i , X −i ), the vector S in R M contains variables that are 1 A worker expecting a year-end bonus of $10,000 (her reference point) will be disappointed if she receives $1,000 instead, although it will certainly be rational to accept it.
2 More precisely, of auctions with interdependent values. 3 A very readable source is Krishna (2002) .
informative about the value of the object, X i is the signal received by bidder i and X −i is the vector of signals received by all other bidders. For all i the function v i (S, X) depends on S in the same way and is symmetric across the remainder bidders' signals X −i . Let Y be the highest signal among the remaining bidders with distribution G(y). We can define
as the expected value of the object when bidder i has signal x i and the highest signal among all remaining bidders is y.
First-Price Auctions
In this subsection we derive symmetric equilibrium bid strategies for a first-price auction with common values. Suppose all bidders except i use the monotone increasing strategy β(x). Expected payoff to bidder i when she has signal x and bids β(z) is given by
dy (2) after adding and subtracting cR z x v(x, y)g(y|x)dy. Maximizing Π(z, x) with respect to z yields the differential equation
with solution
with
Now to prove that (4) is indeed an equilibrium we differentiate expected profits with respect to z to get
For x > z we have that
by affiliation. Moreover, since the function v(x, y) is increasing in the first variable and from equation (3) we get
The inequality is reversed for x < z. Therefore, the bid strategy in (4) is a symmetric equilibrium of the auction.
The case of independent private values is a special case with v i (S, X) = X i , therefore the equilibrium in (4) reduces to
The relationship between the symmetric equilibrium with standard (S) and reference dependent (RD) preferences is given by
Second-Price Auctions
For the second-price auction case suppose that all players except i bid according to
Then expected payoff for bidder i with signal x is
The above expression can be manipulated to give
Adding and subtracting cR
The second term is independent of b and since the function v(x, y) is increasing in the first variable, the integrand in the first term v(x, y)−v(y, y) > 0 for x > y and v(x, y)−v(y, y) < 0 for x < y. Therefore Π(b, x) is maximized by setting
In an independent private-value auction v(x, x) = x, thus the equilibrium strategy is β(x) = αx. Like in the first-price auction the relationship between standard and reference dependent equilibrium strategies is
Cursed Equilibrium
Given the importance of Cursed Equilibrium in explaining overbidding in first-and secondprice common value auctions, we will succinctly describe it in this subsection. The expected value of the object given one's own signal is r(x) = E[V |X = x], this is an incorrect estimate of the true value of the object since it does not condition on winning the auction. In Cursed Equilibrium there is a probability χ that the bidder does not take into account the informational content of winning and a probability 1 − χ that it does. Therefore in a first-price common value auction the problem for the bidder is to choose a bid b to maximize
The symmetric equilibrium of this game is
In a second-price auction a bidder chooses a bid to maximize
The symmetric equilibrium of the second-price auction is given by
The Nash Equilibrium bid strategies are a special case when χ = 0.
3 Statistical Analysis
Setup
In this section the reference dependent (RD) model is tested against other well-known alternatives that have been used to explain overbidding. In the case of an IPV first-price auction we use the risk neutral model as benchmark and also analyze a model with risk aversion, more specifically one with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). In the second-price IPV auction we compare the RD model to the standard risk neutral case and the simple joy-of-winning model with a constant term. The reference dependent model is compared to the risk neutral and Cursed Equilibrium in common value auctions. In particular, in the second-price auction we will show the versatility of our model by analyzing a hybrid model incorporating both reference dependence and cursedness. The Level-k model on the other hand is a non-equilibrium model and thus more suitable to explain initial responses. In this paper we analyze choices of subjects with previous experience with auctions or who had time to learn during the experimental sessions. Therefore, we will not be including the Level-k specification in our statistical analysis. Throughout this section and for a given vector of model-specific parameters γ we use a logit specification to determine the probability of a bid given the signal
In all four types of auctions (in section 2 this was shown for the IPV first-price auction) expected payoffs with reference-dependence can be written as the sum of two terms:
The first one depends on the bid b, signal x and α and the second depends only on the signal x and α. Since
only the first term of (11) is relevant to calculate the probability of a bid given the signal, thus for the remainder of this section we will only use the first term in our calculation of expected values.
Given the bids b and private signals x of each of the N subject in each auction experiment, the vector γ will be chosen to maximize the log-likelihood
We compare the specifications according to the Bayesian Information Criterion, BIC = −2 LL + k log(N ) where LL is the maximized log-likelihood, k is the number of parameters and N the number of observations. The BIC penalizes the addition of extra parameters and can be used with non-nested models. The estimates were obtained using the fmincon function in Matlab (or alternative sqp in Octave) with several vectors of initial values to guarantee convergence to the global maximum of the objective function.
4 Standard errors were computed in all cases using the boostrap method as described in Efron (1982) .
First-Price Independent Private-Value Auction
For the first-price IPV auction we use data from Kagel and Levin (1993) . Subjects were MBA and economics majors from the University of Houston with previous experience. Private values were distributed uniformly on [0, 28.3] and after each period all bids were reported, with the corresponding valuation, in descending order (subject identification numbers were not reported). For our analysis we use data from the auctions with 5 bidders. All bids equal to zero in the dataset have been eliminated leaving 225 observations.
5
Given the parameters used in the experimental setup the reference-dependent equilibrium bid is
The first term of expected payoffs is
Note that standard risk-neutral preferences are a special case with α = 1 (or in particular R = 0).
For the Constant Relative Risk Aversion case we use Table 1 shows the estimates of the three models. The RD model improves on both the risk-neutral and CRRA models in terms of Bayesian Information Criterion.
It is interesting to see that the CRRA parameter estimated here is very similar to the one estimated in Goeree et al. (2002) for a discrete IPVFPA and Chen and Plott (1998) . Determining α allows us to obtain an approximation of the proportionality parameter R since there is consensus among behavioral economists (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) that the loss parameter c is approximately 2. If this is so, R = .0987, subjects act as if their reference point is approximately 10% of their induced value.
6 Figure 1 shows bids, the theoretical RN prediction and the estimated RD coefficient. It is clear that overbidding is proportional to the value of the object, fact that is also consistent with a CRRA model. In terms of qualitative implications both the RD an CRRA imply overbidding relative to the RN bid that is proportional to the private signal. In the experiments analyzed there are 5 players which lead to a RN equilibrium bid of 0.8 times the value of the object, while the estimated coefficients in the RD and CRRA cases are 0.879 and 0.889 respectively.
Second-Price Independent Private Value Auction
For the second-price independent private value auction we also use data from Kagel and Levin (1993) . Like in the first-price case private values were distributed uniformly between [0, 28.3] . We use data from session 2.1, where each auction had 5 bidders all with previous experience in these types of experiments. All bids equal to zero in the dataset have been eliminated leaving 238 observations. Given those parameters the reference dependent equilibrium bid is given by
The first term of expected payoffs in this case is
We also consider a simple "Joy-of-Winning" hypothesis where utility is given by
and t > 0 is the fixed increase in utility derived from winning the auction. This parameter is assumed to be common to all subjects.
The equilibrium bid in the Joy-of-Winning model is Table 2 provides the estimates of the three models. Reference-dependent preferences provide a better fit than standard risk-neutral and Joy-of-Winning preferences. Figure 2 shows the pattern of overbidding relative to the RN Equilibrium. However, in this case the proportionality of overbidding with respect to the value is not as clear as in the first-price auction. Clearly, other factors are in play that lead subjects with low valuations to overbid by almost as much as those with high valuations. A subject may incorrectly reason that increasing the bid has no effect on her payment but increases the probability of winning. As Cooper and Fang (2008) claim, it seems that aspects of both bounded rationality and non-standard preferences are needed to explain overbidding in IPVSPA.
First-Price Common Value Auction
To estimate first-price common value auction models we use data from Kagel and Levin (1986) . In their experiments the value of the object is the same for all players and given
]. The parameter a measures the dispersion of the signal and was changed during sessions. Subjects were Texas A&M undergraduates with previous experience with first-price common value auctions. We use for our analysis auctions with 4 and 5 bidders. Periods 1-3 in both sessions with 4 and 5 players were practice runs and have not been included in the dataset. The parameters of the experimental sessions analyzed here are a = 24, s = 15 and s = 100. The auction with 5 bidders has 90 observations and the one with 4 bidders 72 observations. Given those parameters the reference-dependent equilibrium bid is given by 7 7 A detailed derivation of this equilibrium bid function for standard risk neutral preferences is given in
The expression for the expected value of the object is
The derivation of expected payoffs require the inversion of the bid function. In order to do so we take a linear approximation of equation 12 β RD (x) = α x − a 2 Expected payoffs (without the loss term) in this case are
In order to compute expected payoffs of the Cursed Equilibrium model we also take a linear approximation of the equilibrium bid function
The Nash Equilibrium bid function with risk neutral preferences is a particular case with χ = 0. Notice how a fully cursed bidder (χ = 1) overestimates the value of the object and overbids as a consequence (β N E (x) = x − a/2 < β CE (x) = x − a/n since n > 2). Table 3 provides the estimates of the three models. The RD model improves on both the standard risk-neutral case and the Cursed Equilibrium with 4 bidders. With 5 bidders the RD model slightly beats the standard model but has a lower likelihood than the CE. Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) 
Second-Price Common Value Auction
For the second-price common-value auction we use data from Avery and Kagel (1997) 2-person experiments, more specifically data from sessions 5, 6 and 7. Subjects in sessions 5 and 6 had no previous experience with auctions and subjects in session 7 did have experience.
In order to test an equilibrium hypothesis giving subjects enough repetitions to learn we have deleted the first 5 periods of session 5 and 6, leaving 635 observations. The value of the object was given by the sum of the private signals V i = X 1 + X 2 with X i distributed uniformly on [1, 4] . Since v(x, x) = 2x the RD equilibrium bid is β(x) = 2αx with expected payoffs (without the loss term)
The unconditional value of the object is r(x) = E[V |X = x] = x + 5/2, leading to the Cursed Equilibrium strategy
The cursed equilibrium strategy underbids relative to the risk-neutral case for x > 5/2 and overbids for x < 5/2. This property is reflected in the data as we can see from Figure 4 (Left).
The flexibility of our reference dependence specification allows us to combine it with Curse Equilibrium. The hybrid CE-RD equilibrium bid is given by Table 4 shows the estimates of the four models. The reference dependence model improves upon the standard risk neutral but does not fit as well as Curse Equilibrium, which is not surprising given the pattern in the data observed in Figure 4 . However, it is interesting to see that the hybrid RD-CE model improves upon the CE with standard preferences in terms of BIC. This last result suggests that overbidding in common value auctions may be rationalized in terms of bounded rationality and non-standard preferences. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the effect of reference dependent preferences on equilibrium bid strategies in four different classes of auctions. Unlike previous models we have assumed that the reference point is proportional to the value of the object and that losses are valued more than gains. This specification of preferences leads to equilibrium bid strategies that add a proportionality term to the risk-neutral bid strategies, making them straightforward to compute. The model is tested empirically using bids from first-and second-price private and common value auction experiments. We find that the reference dependence model fits the data better than the risk neutral model in all cases in terms of the Bayesian Information Criterion. In particular, in the private values auction the model fits better than risk aversion and in a second-price auction better than Joy-of-Winning. In common value auctions it fits better than Cursed Equilibrium for a first-price auction with 4 bidders but worse in one with 5 bidders. In a second-price auction a hybrid model combining reference dependence and cursedness does better than each model independently. An interesting feature of our specification is that it is very tractable and can be easily incorporated into other models of bounded rationality like cursed equilibrium or level-k, thus enriching them and as seen in a common value second-price auction increasing their predictive power.
Certainly we do not believe that reference dependence is the only cause of overbidding in experimental auctions but we believe that it is indeed one of the factors playing a role. Our model is a first approximation to this problem (together with the references mentioned in the introduction) and clearly more empirical and theoretical work is needed to fully understand the implications of reference dependence in auctions.
